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40 The Definition of a Child 
course inevitable. They do not impugn the need for some boundary markers. Disputes 
over what might be presumed in our understanding of childhood are also inevitable. They 
too, if properly understood and evaluated, do not obviate the need for recognition of the 
distinctiveness of childhood and thus for some definition of its boundaries. 
Moreover, we can acknowledge that childhood does differ from adulthood and, as 
the preceding section emphasized, acknowledge that the age of majority need not be 
fixed at the same point for all legal entitlements across all cultures and without acknow-
ledgment of the possibility of making case by case determinations of such entitlements 
in some contexts. A child is not, for the law's purposes, an adult. Yet the law; even 
whilst marking that difference, need not characterize all children as alike in all respects. 
Finally, the deference given to states under article 1 to adopt a legal definition of ma-
jority other than 18 years of age, demonstrates a culturally sensitive approach to this issue 
that is often overlooked in criticisms of the Convention that it seeks to impose a Western 
conception of childhood. This flexibility remains problematic given that a state could use 
it to lower the age of majority simply to minimize its obligations under the Convention. 
However, the CRC Committee's routine insistence that an age of majority other than 
18 is incompatible with the Convention is without justification and serves to fuel alle-
gations of a Western bias in the interpretation of the Convention. In contrast, the CRC 
Committee's suggestion that increased dialogue with cultural and religious leaders about 
the importance of conceptualizing persons under 18 as children with special rights, is 
not only justified but likely to be more conducive to extending the protections afforded 
under the Convention. 
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Article 2. The Right to Non-Discrimination 
1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the 
rights set forth in the present Convention 
to each child within their jurisdiction 
without discrimination of any kind, 
irrespective of the child's or her or his 
parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, 
property, disability, birth or other status. 
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate 
measures to ensure that the child is 
protected against all forms of discrimi-
nation or punishment on the basis of 
the status, activities, expressed opinions, 
or beliefs of the child's parents, legal 
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I. Introduction 
A. Background 
To date, every human rights treaty, whether international or regional, obligates States 
Parties to guarantee that the rights enshrined in the treaty are recognized and exercised 
without discrimination of any kind. As an international human rights treaty, the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child ('CRC', 'the Convention') sets such an obligation 
for its States Parties in its article 2. 
The non-discrimination principle actually bears a specific role in the context of 
children's rights. Historically, indeed, the struggle against child discrimination has been 
a central driving (orce in the development of the rights of the child and one understands 
the latter better through the lens of three kinds of child discrimination. 
First of all, the discrimination between children and adults. The principle of non-
discrimination has clearly been at work in the gradual recognition of children's rights as 
such.' For a long time indeed, children were not deemed as capable of holding human 
rights, and were hence discriminated against by comparison to adults. Slowly, but 
surely, children's rights have been recognized. This recognition culminated in the adop-
tion of the Convention in 1989. Children's interests are now deemed as fundamentally 
equal to those of adults, even though they are deemed as more vulnerable and hence 
in need of special protection. Second, the discrimination between children and young 
adults. A second step in the protection of children against discrimination has been the 
definition of the 'child', and the delineation of childhood from adulthood as a result. 
This is still a very controversial question given CRC article l 's incomplete definition 
of the 'child' and the potential discrimination of 'children' depending on their quali-
fication as children from one state to the next.2 Finally, the discrimination between 
children and children. Children are being discriminated against all the time. Little girls 
are not treated like little boys,3 children with a disability are not treated like children 
without a disability,4 rural children do not get the same opportunities as those living 
in cities, migrant children do not benefit from the same rights as local children,5 and 
so on.6 Moreover, children are often discriminated against on account of the status of 
1 Anne McGillivray, 'Why Children Do Have Equal Rights (Reply to Laura Purdy)' (1994) 1 International 
Journal of Children's Rights 243; David Archard, 'Children's Rights' in Edward N Zalta (ed), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 edn) https:// plato.stanford.edu/ archives/ sum2016/ entries/ right.s-
childreni> accessed 4 March 2018; James Griffin, 'Do Children Have Rights?' in David Archard and Cohn 
Macleod (eds), The Moral and Political Status of Children: New Essays (OUP 2002); John Tobin, 'Justifying 
Children's Rights' (2013) 21 International Journal of Children's Rights 395. 
2 See Chapter 1 in this Commentary. See also Sonja Grover, 'On Recognizing Children's Universal 
Rights: What Needs to Change in the Convention on the Rights of the Child' (2004) 12 International Journal 
of Children's Rights 259. . 
3 Nura Taefi, 'The Synthesis of Age and Gender: Intersectionality, International Human Rights Law and 
Marginalisation of the Girl-Child' (2009) 17 International Journal of Children's Rights 345. . 
4 Gerison Lansdown, 'It is our World Too! A Report on the Lives of Disabled Children for the UN General 
Assembly Special Session on Children, New York 2001 ' (Disability Awareness in Action 2001) http://www. 
daa.org.uk/uploads/pdf/It%20is%200ur%20World%20Too!.pdf accessed 4 Mar~h 20'.8. . . . . 
5 Claire Breen, 'Refugee Law in Ireland: Disregarding the Rights of the Ch1ld-Cmzen, D1scnmmatmg 
against the Rights of the Child' (2003) 15 International Journal of Refugee Law 750. . 
6 See examples mentioned in: Rachel Hodgkin and Peter Newell, The Implementation Hand~ook for 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (3rd edn, UNICEF 2007) 24-25; Sarah Muscroft, Chzldrens Rights: 
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their parents or guardians. The adoption of a general clause prohibiting discrimination 
among children based not only on their status, but also on the status of their parents 
was therefore an important step in the struggle against child discrimination. This was 
done with the insertion of paragraph 2 in article 2 of the CRC.7 It guarantees children 
the equal benefit of all Convention rights without discrimination. 
B. Context 
Non-discrimination clauses, whether general or specific, are among the most standard 
provisions in international human rights treaties. To assess the comparative potential and 
limits of article 2, it is worth taking a brief look at major international and regional guar-
antees of the principle of non-discrimination and their applicability to children. It is only 
by replacing the principle in its general context that one is able to grasp the full measure 
of the progress made with the adoption of article 2 of the CRC, but also some of its cur-
rent limitations. 
1. Non-Discrimination in International and Regional Human Rights Law 
Equality and non-discrimination are fundamental moral principles.8 They are also key 
constitutional principles in a modern democracy where human rights are protected. 
As a matter of fact, it is the egalitarian dimension of both human rights and dem-
ocracy that explains why they are usually regarded as interrelated. Human rights are 
situated in a constitutive relationship to equal moral status and democracy is the only 
political regime able to protect that equal moral status and the corresponding political 
equality.9 
No wonder then that, nowadays, equality and non-discrimination occupy pride 
of place in most written constitutions and that numerous countries have non-
discrimination legislation either against all forms of discrimination or against some 
specific forms of discrimination only, such as racial or sex discrimination. 
Whereas traditional international law used not to concern itself with the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination, except in relation to states and state sovereignty, the 
Second World War triggered an unprecedented concern for human rights protection, 
including guaranteeing them for all without discrimination. The 1945 Charter of the 
Equal Rights? Diversity, Difference and the Issue of Discrimination (The International Save the Children 
Alliance 2000) 32-40. 
7 See on art 2 CRC: Lisa Hitch, 'Non-discrimination and the Rights of the Child, Article 2' (1989) 7 
New York University Law School Journal of Human Rights '47; Philip Alston, 'Cadre juridique de la Convention 
relative aux droits de l' enfant' (1992) 91 (2) Bulletin des droits de l'homme 1; Geraldine Van Bueren, The 
International Law on the Rights of the Child (Kluwer 1995) ch 2; Lawrence J LeBlanc, The Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. United Nations Lawmaking on Human Rights (University of Nebraska Press 1995) 94-107; 
Sharon Detrick, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Martin us Nijhoff 
1999) art 2; Muscroft (n 6) Part I; Samantha Besson, 'The Non-discrimination Principle in the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child' (2005) 13 The International Journal of Children's Rights 433; Hodgkin and Newell 
(n 6) art 2; Bruce Abramson, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 
2: The Right of Non-discrimination (Martin us Nijhoff 2008); Nevena Vuckovic Sahovic, Jaap Doek, and Jean 
Zermatten, The Rights of the Child in International Law (Stampfli 2012) part 2, chapter 3. 
8 On the relationship between equality and non-discrimination, see Samantha Besson, 'The Egalitarian 
Dimension of Human Rights' (2013) 136 Archiv fur Sozial- und Rechtsphilosophie Beiheft 19. 
9 On the egalitarian dimension of human rights and the relationship between human rights and democracy, 
see ibid. 
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United Nations itself includes the principle of equal rights of peoples and the promotion 
and encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as two of its 
major goals. 10 
From the 1950s onwards, conventional guarantees of the non-discrimination principle 
multiplied. The principle of non-discrimination is now one of the most frequently pro-
tected norms of international human rights law. 11 The generality and regularity of these 
international legal recognitions of the principle of non-discrimination is actually often 
taken as evidence of its customary nature. 12 It is even sometimes invoked as proof of its 
imperative or pre-emptive force. 13 According to the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (Inter-Am. CtHR), 14 for instance, the prohibition of discrimination belongs to 
jus cogens norms. 
In a nutshell, one may identify three kinds of guarantees of the principle of non-
discrimination in international human rights law: general, ground-specific, and context-
specific prohibitions of discrimination. 
First of all, general prohibitions of discrimination. These clauses prohibit discrimin-
ation on all grounds in the protection of the human rights guaranteed by the relevant 
international instrument. 
The three major international human rights instruments, that is, the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights ('UDHR'),15 the 1966 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights ('ICCPR') and the 1966 International Covenant on Econom~c, Social 
and Cultural Rights ('ICESCR')16 protect the principle of non-discrimination in a gen-
eral clause, placed prominently at the beginning of the treaties. Article 2 of the UDHR 
10 Arrs 1(2) and 1(3) UN Charter (adopted 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI. See also art 55(c). 
11 See on non-discrimination in international human rights law: Wilhelm Kewenig, Der Grundsatz der 
Nichtdiskriminierung im Volkerrecht der internationalen Beziehungen, 1M I- Der Begriff der Diskriminierung 
(Athenaum 1972); Egbert WVierdag, The Concept of Discrimination in International Law, with Special Reference 
to Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 1973); Christian Tomuschat, 'Equality and Non-discrimination under 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' in Ingo von Munch (ed), Staatsrecht, Volkerrecht, 
Europarecht: Festschrift far Hans-Jurgen Schlochauer zum 75. Geburtstag am 28. Marz 1981 (W de Gruyter 
1981); Warwick McKean, Equality and Discrimination under International Law (OUP 1983); Bertrand 
Ramcharan, 'Equality and Non-discrimination' in Louis Henkin (ed), The International Bill of Rights: The 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Columbia University Press 1983); Yo ram Dinstein, 'Discrimination and 
International Human Rights' ( 1985) 15 Israel Yearbook of Human Rights 11; Anne Bayefsky, 'The Principle of 
Equality and Non-discrimination in International Law' (1990) 11 Human Rights Law Journal l; Karl] Partsch, 
'Discrimination' in Ronald St J Macdonald, Franz Matscher, and Herbert Petzold (eds), The European System 
far the Protection of Human Rights (Martin us Nijhoff 1993) 571- 92; Wouter Vandenhole, Non-discrimination 
and Equality in the vtew of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies (Intersentia-Hart 2005); Dinah Shelton, 
'Prohibited Discrimination in International Human Rights Law' in Aristotle Constantinides and Nikos Zaikos 
(eds) , The Diversity of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 261- 92; Olivier de Schutter, International 
Human Rights Law (2nd edn, Cambridge 2014) 632-757; Daniel Moeckli, 'Equality and Non-discrimination' 
in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, and Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds), International Human Rights Law (3nd edn, 
OUP 2018) 148- 64. 
12 See: South West Africa (Second Phase, Judgment) [1966] ICJ Rep 3, 293 (Tanaka J); IC], Barcelona 
Traction (Second Phase, Judgment) [1970] IC] Rep 3, 32. 
13 McKean (n 11) 277-83; Hitch (n 7) 50; Ramcharan (n 11) 249; Van Bueren (n 7) 55. 
14 Inter-Am CtHR,Juridical Condition of the UndccumentedMigrants, Adviso1y Opinion OC-18/03 (2003) 
Series A No 18, paras 97 ff, 101. 
15 Universal Declaration of Human Rights UNGA Res 21 7 A(III). 
16 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered imo force 23 
March 1976) 999 UNTS 17 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 
December 1966, entered into force 3 July 1976) 993 UNTS 3. 
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prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights recognized in the Declaration, 
but the principle of non-discrimination is also specified further in the legal context with 
a guarantee of equality before the law and in the law (UDHR art 7). 17 Article 2(1) of 
the ICCPR prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights recognized in the 
Convention while article 26 of the ICCPR provides an autonomous guarantee of equality 
in and before the law and hence against discrimination. 18 Article 2(2) of the ICESCR 
contains a general non-discrimination clause that prohibits discrimination in the enjoy-
ment of the rights in the ICESCR. There is, however, no equivalent to article 26 of the 
ICCPR in the ICESCR.19 
General prohibitions of discrimination may also be found in all regional human rights 
treaties. The principle of non-discrimination appears in the first article of the American 
Convention on Human Rights ('ACHR') which lays down the obligations of States 
Parties20 and in the second article of the African Charter on H uman and Peoples' Rights 
('ACHPR').21 Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights ('ECHR')22 
prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
Convention, whereas article 1 of Protocol No 12 to the ECHR contains an autonomous 
17 Universal Declaration of Human Rights UNGA Res 217 A(III). Art 2 UDHR reads as follows: 'Everyone 
is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status'. Arrs 10, 16, 21, and 26(2) also refer to components of equality. 
18 Art 2(1) ICCPR reads as follows: 'Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and 
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the pre-
sent Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.' According to art 26 ICCPR: 'All persons 
are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this 
respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection 
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status'. 
19 Art 2(2) ICESCR reads as follows: 'The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee 
that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.' 
20 American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 
1978) (1969) 9 ILM 99. A.rt 1 reads as follow: 'The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect 
the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free 
and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social 
condition'. See also art 3 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 17 November 1988, entered into force 16 November 
1999) (1989) 28 ILM 156. 
2 1 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 
1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58. Art 2 reads as follows: 'Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such 
as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, 
fortune, birtl1 or other status' . Art 3 guarantees that every individual shall be equal before the law and shall be 
entitled to equal protection of the law. 
22 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol 
11 and 14 (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) CETS 5. Art 14 reads as fol-
lows: 'The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without dis-
crimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status'. See also Art E of the 1996 
European Social Charter (European Social Charter revised, adopted 3 May 1996, entered into force 1 July 
1999) CETS 163 and the Preamble to the 1961 European Social Charter. 
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prohibition of discrimination which extends the prohibition laid down in article 14 of 
the ECHR to 'any right set forth by law' and to any action taken by a public authority.23 
Finally, mention should be made of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union.24 An entire chapter of the Charter is dedicated to equality (Chapter III). It starts 
with a general prohibition of discrimination (art 21), but also contains a specific article 
on children's rights (art 24). 
These general international and regional guarantees of the non-discrimination principle 
share common features. First of all, most of them are subordinate and non-autonomous 
clauses, which qualify other guaranteed rights in commending their respect free of any 
discrimination rather than prohibiting discrimination in itself.25 This is the case, for in-
stance, of article 2(1) of the ICCPR, article 2(2) of the ICESCR, article 2 of the UDHR, 
article 1 of the ACHR, article 2 of the ACHPR, and article 14 of the ECHR. Exceptions 
to this may be found in article 7 of the UDHR, article 26 of the ICCPR, article 1 Protocol 
No 12 of the ECHR and article 24 of the ACHR. These autonomous clauses guarantee 
equality in and before the law not merely in the context of a threat to another Covenant 
or Convention right or freedom, but in general. Second, most of these provisions have 
an open-ended scope. In this sense, the list of prohibited discrimination grounds is purely 
indicative and can be extended to other similar grounds.26 This is what is meant by terms 
like 'other status' or 'such as' used in the non-discrimination clauses. As to the list of ex-
emplary discrimination grounds prohibited in all the clauses mentioned, it is more or less 
the same. Finally, most of these guarantees are not directly justiciable norms. In this sense, 
they cannot be invoked directly by individuals against the state. Exceptions to this may 
be found in article 26 of the ICCPR, article 14 of the ECHR, article 1 Protocol No 12 of 
the ECHR, and article 24 of the ACHR. 
Second, ground-specific prohibitions of discrimination. These clauses prohibit discrim-
ination on specific grounds only, in the context of the protection of the human rights 
guaranteed by the relevant international instrument-which is itself often drafted as a 
non-discrimination treaty. 
The two most prominent ground-specific prohibitions of discrimination are to be 
found in the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination ('ICERD') and in the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Discrimination against Women ('CEDAW').27 The two conventions aim at combating 
various forms of ground-specific discrimination by granting non-discrimination rights.28 
They also include a ground-specific non-discrimination clause applicable to the exercise 
of these other ground-specific non-discrimination rights in the Convention (ICERD art 
23 Protocol No 12 to the ECHR (adopted 4 November 2000, entered into force 1 April 2005) CETS 177. 
The Protocol is open for signature by all rhe members States of rhe Council of Europe, but as of November 
2018 only twenty of the forty-seven members States have ratified it. 
24 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [201 OJ OJ C83/02. 
25 Bayefsky (n 11) 3-4. See also UN Human Rights Committee ('HR Committee'), 'General Comment 
No 18: Non-discrimination' (1989) ('HRC GC 18') in Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies (2008) HRI/GEN/l/Rev.9 (Vol I) 195 para 12. · 
26 Bayefsky (n 11) 5- 8. 
27 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 
December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195; Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September· 
1981) 1249 UNTS 13. 
28 On rhe distinction between non-discrimination rights and the principle of non-discrimination in inter-
national human rights law, see Besson, 'The Egalitarian Dimension' (n 8). 
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5; and CEDAW art 3). A distinct example is the 2006 Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities ('CRPD').29 The Convention includes various disability-specific 
rights, and not only non-discrimination rights like the other two, but it also includes 
a disability-specific non-discrimination clause (CRPD art 5). It further entails non-
discrimination clauses addressing cases of multiple discrimination of disabled women 
(CRPD art 6) and, as we will see, disabled children (CRPD art 7). 
Finally, context-specific prohibitions of discrimination. These clauses prohibit discrim-
ination in the protection of the human rights guaranteed by the relevant international 
instrument, albeit in a specific context only: that is, that of the instrument itself, which is 
often drafted as a context-specific non-discrimination treaty. One may mention the 1958 
ILO Convention no 111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and 
Occupation and the 1960 UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education.30 
2. Extension to Children 
In principle, children are protected by the general non-discrimination clauses entailed in 
international and regional human rights instruments, whether general, ground-specific, 
or context-specific, just as adults would in the same situation.31 After all, human rights 
treaties are supposed to apply to 'every human being', and hence independently of age. 
As a matter of fact, age discrimination is directly or at least indirectly prohibited by most 
non-discrimination clauses in international and regional human rights instruffi@l;S and 
should apply a fortiori to other international and regional human rights instruments.32 
All the same, the principle of non-discrimination as we know it from international 
and regional human rights law has been largely unable to effectively counter child dis-
crimination.33 This is due partly to these instruments' general misapplication and reser-
vations, but also to their inadequacy to protect children against all kinds of child-specific 
discrimination. 
There are various types of child-specific discrimination one may mention. First, chil-
dren often require special measures of protection that take into account their particular 
29 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 
3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 3. 
30 UNESCO CoQvention against Discrimination in Education (adopted 14 December 1960, entered into 
force 29 May 1962) 429 UNTS 93; !LO Convention (no 111) concerning Discrimination in Respect of 
Employment and Occupation (adopted 25 June 1958, entered into force 15 June 1960) 362 UNTS 31. 
As regards work, one should also mention the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (adopted 18 December 1990, entered into force 1 July 
2003) 2220 UNTS 3. Art 7 ICPMW prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the 
Convention 'in accordance with the international instruments concerning human rights'. 
31 Susan Marks and Andrew Clapham, International Human Rights Lexicon (OUP 2005) 26; See HR 
Committee, 'General Comment no 17: Article 24. Rights of the Child' (1989) reproduced in Compilation of 
General Comments and General Recommendations adtJpted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies (2008) HRI/GEN/ l / 
Rev.9 (Vol I) 193 para 2. 
32 Age is an explicit prohibited ground in the ICPMW (art 7), the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
rhe European Union (art 21) and the Inter-American Convention against all Forms of Discrimination and 
Intolerance (adopted 5 June 2013, not yet entered into force) OEA/Ser.P AG/RES. 2804 article 1). Ir has 
been recognized as a prohibited ground of discrimination by the HR C (HR Committee, Love et al. v Australia 
(Comm no 983/2001) (final views adopted on 25 March 2003) [para 8.2) and the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights ('ESCR Committee') ('General Comment No 6: The economic, social and cultural 
rights ofolder persons' (1995) in 'Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted 
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2008) HRI/GEN/ l /Rev.9 (Vol I) 27 paras 11-12). As this last example 
shows, discrimination based on age often refers to discrimination against elderly people, however. 
33 Van Bueren (n 7) 39. 
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vulnerability vis-a-vis the state, but also vis-a-vis their families and other individuals. 
Children may indeed be discriminated against because of actions that their parents or 
family members have engaged in, and hence in a way that is mediated through their 
parents. Second, children are often not only discriminated against when compared to 
other children, but also by comparison to adults. Thus, children are excluded from ac-
tively taking part in judicial procedures through which they could claim their rights not 
to be discriminated against. Finally, children are often doubly discriminated against: first, 
as children and, second, as members of a specific group. These discriminations are often 
invisible, partly because the difference of treatment based on age may appear, at first sight, 
necessary to protect the child. This is the case, for instance, of certain differentiations 
based on age for sexual consent between homosexual and heterosexual acts, which have 
been thought to protect young adults and hence deemed justified, but which have turned 
out quite detrimental to homosexual young adults.34 This 'double jeopardy' weighing on 
children is difficult to handle merely through general guarantees of the principle of non-
discrimination and needs to be addressed specifically. 
Hence the need for a special international instrument guaranteeing children the re-
spect of their human rights without discrimination. 
C. Specificity 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child includes a guarantee of the principle of 
non-discrimination in article 2.35 It is a general discrimination clause that is neither 
ground-specific nor context-specific. It is unique to the extent that it is a general non-
discrimination clause in a ground-specific human rights instrument. Unlike the other 
non-discrimination clauses in ground-specific instruments, it is not restricted to one dis-
crimination ground only. Nor, however, is it so general that it is oblivious to the child-
specific nature of the discrimination at stake and it cannot therefore be conflated with a 
general non-discrimination clause in a general human rights instrument. 
At first sight, the wording of article 2 of the CRC is very similar to that of several 
other general non-discrimination clauses in general human rights instruments, such as 
article 2(1) of the ICCPR or article 2(2) of the ICESCR. It may be compared to those 
clauses as follows. 
First, article 2 uses the term 'discrimination' like article 2(2) of the ICESCR and article 
14 of the ECHR, by contrast to article 2(1) of the ICCPR and article 2 of the UDHR 
which refer to 'distinction' .36 It is generally accepted nowadays that both refer to the same 
kind of differentiation without reason. Second, the list of prohibited grounds of discrim-
ination in article 2(1) is the same as those of major non-discrimination clauses with the 
additional grounds of disability and ethnic origin. Third, it is important to emphasize that 
article 2(1) is a subordinate rather than an autonomous clause of non-discrimination. 
As such, it applies only to those rights guaranteed in the Convention, by contrast to 
34 ibid 39- 40. See ECtHR, Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1981) Series A no 45. 
35 One of the regional counterparts of the CRC, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(adopted 11July1990, entered into force 29 November 1999) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49, also contains 
a general provision on non-discrimination (art 3), which reads as follows: 'Every child shall be entitled to the 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in this Charter irrespective of the child's or 
his/her parents' or legal guardians' race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status'. 
36 Hitch (n 7) 54-58. 
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article 26 of the ICCPR, for instance. In this sense, it is very similar to article 2(1) of the 
ICCPR, article 2(2) of the ICESCR, and article 14 of the ECHR. This is not the case, 
however, of article 2(2) of the CRC which applies to cases of discrimination of a child on 
the basis of her or his parents' activities or status only. Fourth, the scope of application of 
article 2 is open and cannot be limited to some areas only. It applies to education as much 
as to private ownership. Finally, article 2 is a directly j usticiable clause that may be invoked 
by victims of discrimination directly before domestic institutions. This mirrors the solu-
tion chosen by article 2(1) of the ICCPR. 
A careful reading of the international provisions discussed before shows, however, that 
article 2 of the CRC is also unique in several ways. On the one hand, it protects the child 
in all her or his specificities and not only as any other human being (art 2(1)). On the 
other, it protects children not only against discrimination directly targeted at them, but 
also against discrimination based on attributes of their parents, legal guardians or family 
members (art 2(1) and (2)) . Indeed, very often, children are easy targets for discrimin-
ation through their parents. 
Thus, like other children's rights in the Convention, article 2 of the CRC recognizes 
both the special status and needs of children, due to their very dependency, through 
a child-specific non-discrimination clause, and, at the same time, the same basic 
human rights and fundamental freedoms already recognized to adults through a non-
discrimination clause that is at least as inclusive as general non-discrimination clauses in 
other international and regional human rights instruments. 
II. Analysis 
Article 2 is a short but complex provision that requires a careful analysis. The following 
section presents its function, the duties implied by this provision, and its scope and con-
tent, before turning to its implementation and the monitoring thereof. A final section 
considers the relationship between article 2 CRC and specific measures protecting par-
ticularly vulnerable children against discrimination. 
A. Function 
Article 2 is the general non-discrimination clause in the Convention on the Rights of 
the Chikl. Together with articles 3, 6, and 12 of the CRC, if forms part of the so-called 
general principles of the CRC.37 As such, it applies to the interpretation and application 
of the whole treaty and to the many ways in which children rights may be applied in a 
discriminatory fashion.38 
37 CRC Committee, 'Overview of the reporting procedures' (1994) CRC/C/33; CRC Committee, 'General 
guidelines regarding the form and content of initial reports to be submitted by States Parties under article 44, 
paragraph 1 (a), of the Convention on the Rights of the Child' (1991) CRC/C/5 ('CRC Committee, General 
guidelines'), para 9; CRC Committee, 'Ge,neral Comment No 5: General Measures of Implementation of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (arts 4, 42, and 44, para 6) ' (2003) ('CRC GC 5') reproduced 
in 'Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies' (2008) HRI/GEN/ l/Rev.9 (Vol II) 421, para 12. See on the general principles of the CRC, Laura 
Lundy and Bronagh Byrne, 'The Four General Principles of the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child: the Potential Value of the Approach in Other Areas of Human Rights Law' in Eva Brems, Ellen 
Desmet, and Wourer Vandenhole (eds), Children's Rights Law in the Global Human Rights Landscape: Isolation, 
Inspiration, Integration? (Routledge 2017) 52-70. 
38 Muscroft (n 6) 27-28. 
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Article 2 amounts to more than a non-discrimination clause, however. It also has an-
other, albeit related, function in the determination of the content of States Parties' obli-
gations. Besides the obligations not to discriminate in the protection of all the rights set 
forth in the Convention, article 2 also identifies the general obligations of States Parties 
with respect to those rights.39 This general function of article 2 comes very close to that 
of article 4 of the CRC which deals with the implementation of Convention rights. 
Thus, one may say, following Philip Alston, that article 2(1) states the objectives of the 
Convention, while article 4 indicates the means to implement them.40 
This dual function of article 2 of the CRC is essential to understanding the duties of 
States Parties entailed in this provision. First, States Parties shall respect and ensure all the 
rights set forth in the Convention. The means for doing so are described in article 4 of 
the CRC41-not in article 2 as it is the case in the ICCPR. Second, States Parties shall re-
spect and ensure all the rights set forth in the Convention without discrimination. In what 
follows, we will focus on the specific duties related to the prohibition of discrimination. 
B. Duties: 'Shall Respect and Ensure' and 'Shall Take All 
Appropriate Measures' 
Like article 2(1) of the ICCPR, article 2(1) of the CRC foresees two kinds of duties (or 
obligations) which complement each other.42 
First of all, duties to respect. These duties are passive or negative. In general, duties 
to respect require States Parties to refrain from violating any of the rights enshrined in 
the Convention.43 In relation to the prohibition of discrimination, they imply that the 
State may not actively discriminate in any way against children in their protected rights. 
Second, duties to ensure. In his commentary on the ICCPR, Nowak has explained that 
'[i]n contrast to the obligation to respect ... the obligation to ensure is a positive duty'.44 
He has further explained that: 
The obligation to ensure consists of the obligation to protect individuals against interference by 
third parties (horizontal effect) and the obligation to fulfil which in turn incorporates and obliga-
tion to facilitate the enjoyment of human rights and provide services.45 
This model aligns with what is typically referred to as the typology of tripartite obliga-
tions under international human rights law which consists of an obligation to respect, 
protect, and fulfil (promote).46 
39 See HR Committee, 'General Comment No 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed 
on States Parties to the Covenant' (2004) ('HRC GC 31 ') reproduced in 'Compilation of General Comments 
and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2008) HRI/GEN/l/Rev.9 (Vol I) 
243, paras 6, 8, I 0. 
40 Alston (n 7) 4. 41 See chapter 4 of this Commentary. 42 Detrick (n 7) 68-69. 
43 Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd NP Engel 2005) 
37; Human Rights Committee General Comment No 31: 'The Nature of the General Legal Obligation im-
posed on State Parties to the Covenant' CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.13 (26 May 2004) ('HRC GC 31') para 6; 
Robin Geib, 'The Obligation to Respect and to Ensure Respect for the Conventions' in Andrew Clapham, 
Paola Gaeta, and Marco Sassoli (eds), 1he 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (OUP 2015) 111, 117 
(noting that this obligation 'simply amounts to a reaffirmation of the rule expressed with the Latin tag pacta 
sunt servanda and codified in Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties'). 
· 
44 Nowak (n 43) 37. See also: HRC GC 31 (n 43) para 6; Geib (n 43) 117-19; Hodgkin and Newell 
(n 6) 22. 
45 Nowak (n 43) 38. 
46 For a discussion of the development and features of this model see: Olivier de Schutter (n 11) chapter 3; 
Walter Kalin and Jorg Kunzli, 1he Law of International Human Rights Protection (OUP 2009) 96-120. The 
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In general, therefore, the duty 'to respect and ensure' under article 2 requires States 
Parties to tal\:e whatever measures are necessary to give effect to the rights enshrined in 
the Convention.47 It is a broad and onerous obligation that applies to all rights quite in-
dependent of the obligation to protect children against discrimination in their enjoyment 
of these rights. With respect to the prohibition of discrimination, however, there is both 
a negative duty to refrain from discrimination and a positive duty to prevent discrim-
ination irrespective of whether the threat arises from a government or private actor.48 
This protection can take place legally through the adoption of non-discrimination 
laws.49 Often, however, non-discrimination laws exist, but are not effectively imple-
mented.50 As a result, practical measures should also be taken to prevent and combat 
discrimination that cannot: only be eradicated through laws, as in the context of social, 
economic, and cultural rights, for instance. Socially internalized forms of discrimination 
and the media are indeed at the origins of many forms of discrimination and should be 
targeted directly.51 This is confirmed by article 4 of the CRC which emphasizes that le-
gislative measures are not the only ones the state should take to combat discrimination. 
Ir is important to emphasize that positive duties of protection apply to all areas of pol-
itical control, whether official or private, thus also calling for mainstreaming measures 
in all these areas. 
These positive duties under article 2(1) are complemented by the duties to take all appro-
priate measures set by article 2(2) in relationship to grounds of discrimination related to the 
child's parents' or guardians' person or status. 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child ('CRC Committee', 'the Committee') has 
summarized these two kinds of non-discrimination duties in its general comment on the 
best interest of the child: 
The right to non-discrimination is not a passive obligation, prohibiting all forms of discrimination 
in the enjoyment of rights under the Convention, but also requires appropriate proactive meas-
ures taken by the State to ensure effective equal opportunities for all children to enjoy the rights 
tripartite typology is not an explicit feature of the CRC or indeed other international human rights instruments. 
Its emergence and gradual acceptance however can be traced to the efforts of scholars and Committee bodies in 
the 80s and 90s who sought to generate an understanding and acceptance of economic and social rights relative 
to civil and political rights. See especially the work of: Asjborn Aide, 1he Right to Adequate Food as a Human 
Right E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/25 (1983); Henry Shue, Basic Rights, Subsistence, Af/luence and US Foreign Policy 
(Princeton University, Princeton 1980) 52; The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (1997) (adopted by the a group of academic experts in Maastricht 22-26 January 1997) para 6 
('Like civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights impose three different types of obligations 
on States: the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil'); ESCR Committee, General Comment No 12: The 
Right to Adequate Food (art 11) E/C.12/1999/5 (12 May 1999) para 15; African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, 1he Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v 
Nigeria Comm No 155/96 (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR) (15th Annual Activity Report) paras 44-48; Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Principles and Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty 
Reduction Strategies (2005) paras 47--48. 
47 Thomas Buergenthal, 'To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations' in Louis 
Henkin (ed), 1he International Bill of Rights (Columbia University Press 1981) 77; see the comment made 
by the United Nations Children's Fund (UN Doc E/CN.4/1989/WG.l/CRP.l) during the drafting process, 
reproduced in Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Legislative History of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations 2007) 329-30 ('Legislative History') . 
48 Alston (n 7) 4-5. 49 Hodgkin and Newell (n 6) 23. 50 Muscroft (n 6) 34. 
51 CRC Committee, CO Bosnia and Herzegovina, CRC/C/BIH/C0/2-4 paras 29-30; Hodgkin and 
Newell (n 6) 24. 
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under the Convention. This may require positive measures aimed at redressing a situation of real 
inequality.52 
More generally, the States Parties' obligations under article 2 have been specified further 
by the Committee in various general comments and concluding observations. 
In its 'General Comments', on the one hand, the CRC Committee considers that article 
2 imposes the following duties: to ensure that the principle of non-discrimination is re-
flected in all domestic legislation and can be directly applied and appropriately monitored 
and enforced through judicial and administrative bodies; to identify individual children 
and groups of children the recognition and realization of whose rights may demand spe-
cial measures; to collect data and disaggregate them in order to identify discrimination; to 
amend legislation, administration, and resource allocation, as well as educational meas-
ures when needed to change attitudes; and to take special measures.53 Specific obligations 
to vulnerable children have also been identified by the Committee. To combat discrimin-
ation against children with disabilities, for example, states should: include disability as a 
forbidden ground in their constitution or legislation; provide effective remedies in case of 
violations of the rights of children with disabilities; conduct awareness-raising and educa-
tional campaigns; and pay particular attention to girls with disabilities.54 
Specific duties relating to the non-discrimination principle may also be identified from 
the CRC Committee's concluding observations on States Parties' reports, on the other 
hand. The Committee regularly requests, for instance, that states provide 'specific in-
formation on the measures and programmes relevant to the Convention on the rights 
of the child undertaken by the State party to follow up on the Durban Declaration and 
Programme of Action adopted at the 2001 World conference against racism, racial dis-
crimination, xenophobia and related intolerance' .55 
C. Scope: 'The Rights Set Forth in the Present Convention to Each 
Child within Their Jurisdiction' 
To get a full grasp of the scope of article 2, its specific material, personal, and territorial 
scopes need to be examined in turn. 
52 CRC Committee, 'General Comment No 14 on the right of the child to have her or his best interests 
taken.as a primary consideration (art 3, para I) ' (2013) CRC/C/GC/14 ('CRC GC 14') paras 40, 48. 
53 CRC Committee, 'General Comment No 11: Indigenous children and their rights under the Convention' 
(2009) CRC/C/GC/11 ('CRC GC 11 ') paras 23-24; CRC GC 5 (n 37) para 12. 
54 CRC Committee, 'General Comment No 9: The rights of children with disabilities' (2006) reproduced 
in 'Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies' (2008) HRI/GEN/ l/Rev.9 (Vol II) 497 ('CRC GC 9') para 9. With respect to migrant children 
see: 'Joint General Comment No 3 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of their Families and No 22 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the general prin-
ciples regarding the human rights of children in the context of international migration' (2017) CMW/C/GC/ 
3-CRC/C/GC/22 paras 21-26; CRC Committee, 'General Comment No 21 on children in street situations 
(201 7) CRC/C/GC/21 paras 25- 27; CRC Committee, 'General Comment No 20 on the Implementation of 
the Rights of the Child During Adolescence (2016) CRC/C/GC/20 ('CRC GC 20') para 21; CRC GC 11 
(n 53) paras 23-29. 
55 CRC Committee, CO Albania, CRC/C/ALB/C0/2-4 para 28; CO Malta, CRC/C/\vfLT/C0/2 para 29; 
CO Guyana, CRC/C/GUY/C0/2-4 para 25; CO Andorra, CRC/C/15/Add.176 para 30; CO Bahrain, CRC/ 
C/15/Add.175 para 30; CO Bangladesh, CRC/C/15/Add.221 para30; CO Belarus, CRC/C/15/Add.180 pa_ra 
30; CO Brunei Darussalam, CRC/C/15/Add.219 par 28; CO New Zealand, CRC/C/15/Add.216 para 24. 
See also CRC GC 11 (n 53) para 28. 
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I. Material Scope 
The material scope of article 2 may be approached from the perspective of the rights 
protected, but also from that of the areas covered and that of the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination. 
(a) Rights Protected 
The phrase 'the rights set forth in the present Convention' in article 2(1) indicates that the 
obligation of non-discrimination applies only with respect to the rights set forth in the 
Convention, and not beyond. The rights in the Convention may indeed be respected in 
ways that exclude or discriminate children. 
The CRC's principle of non-discrimination is not an independent and autonomous 
principle of non-discrimination, therefore, but a dependent or derivative one. In that 
respect, it comes close to the one captured by most other non-discrimination clauses in 
international human rights instruments. 
There is an exception to this restriction, however, in article 2(2). That provision extends 
the prohibition of discrimination to any rights and areas where discrimination may take 
place, even if they fall outside the ambit of the Convention. This has very broad implica-
tions, although these remain still largely unexplored to date.56 
(b) Areas Covered 
Depending on the duties at stake, the non-discrimination obligations of the state have a 
different material scope. 
When the obligation is one of negative 'respect' of the prohibition of discrimination 
according to article 2(1), the obligation applies only to any governmental measure of state 
action by an official or authority at any level of government. When the obligation is one 
of positive 'protection' according to article 2(1) and 2(2), however, the obligation extends 
also to removing private obstacles to the enjoyment of the designated rights. 
For the rest, however, there are no context-specific restrictions ro the material scope of 
article 2 of the CRC. 
(c) Grounds of Discrimination 
The insertion of an exhaustive list of prohibited discrimination grounds can restrict the 
material scope of a prohibition of discrimination. This is the case in the CEDAW, which 
only refers to discrimination against women, and in the CERD, which only refer to dis-
crimination on the grounds of race, colour, or ethnic or national origin. 
By contrast, article 2(1) of the CRC contains a long list of suspect grounds. This list 
is purely exemplary, however, and can be extended to other grounds as is apparent from 
the wording 'other status' at the end of the list. The interpretation of the notion of 'other 
status' is addressed in further detail below. Article 2(2) only applies, on the contrary, to 
the discrimination of children that is based on the status of their parents. 
Of course, article 2 of the CRC protects children against discrimination and, as result, 
focuses on the child-specific dimensions of those discriminations whatever the grounds. 
2. Personal Scope 
The personal scope of article 2 can be apprehended from the perspective of the right-
holders and from that of its duty-bearers. Duties stemming from article 2 can indeed be 
56 Hodgkin and Newell (n 6) 30. 
BESSON/KLEBER 
54 The Right to Non-Discrimination 
directly invoked by children against the institutions of States Parties. To that extent, it 
amounts to more than an interpretative principle. 
(a) Right-Holders 
Those protected against discrimination by article 2 are all children. As such, the applica-
tion of article 2 depends on article 1 of the CRC's definition of 'child'.57 This definition 
regards any person under 18 as a child, except when national law determines a different 
age for the children's majority. This flexibility has been heavily criticized for allowing 
discrimination among children of different States Parties. One may argue, however, that 
the age-based definition in the Convention has already become quite authoritative since 
1989 and this may be seen as a sign of progress when compared to the multitude of def-
initions that used to prevail. 
The only exceptions to the general scope of right-holders of article 2 are identified in 
article 22, 23 and 30 of the CRC. Those three provisions provide for special protection 
against discrimination of children in particularly vulnerable situations, and respectively to 
refugee, disabled and indigenous children. Only children falling into these three groups 
may therefore benefit from the special protection measures foreseen by the respective pro-
vision, thus giving rise to interesting questions of inequality before non-discrimination 
clauses and hence of discrimination in non-discrimination rights. 
Of course, the children protected against discrimination are only those children situ-
ated 'within the jurisdiction' of the relevant State party (art 2(1)) . As explained below, jur-
isdiction should not be conflated with nationality, however. The children protected may 
not be discriminated against because they are non-nationals of the State in which they are 
discriminated. This applies even if they are in irregular situation. 
(b) Duty-Bearers 
From a purely practical point of view, discrimination, like any other violation of human 
rights, may have many perpetrators. 
First of all, public institutions. They are indeed the source of power and coercion that 
can most discriminate or omit to prevent discrimination from occurring. Second, parents 
or guardians. They constitute another important source of discrimination, as they dispose 
legally and materially of important power over children. Third, other individuals. Other 
individuals in the society may also contribute to causing discrimination against children. 
This is the case of the media or of other social groups such as religious lobbies which may 
contribute to entrenching biases against children in social attitudes.58 Finally, other chil-
dren. Children are also often at the origin of discrimination against other children. 
Identifying the actual bearers of the corresponding non-discrimination duties is more 
complicated, however. The scope of duty-bearers of the prohibition of non-discrimination 
is indeed more restricted than the scope of potential discriminators. 
First of all, States are clearly the sole negative and positive duty-bearers of article 2(1) 
and 2(2), provided they have ratified the Convention. Of course, their duties also ex-
tend, as explained before, to preventing individuals from discriminating against children. 
Indeed, States Parties have a positive duty to prevent legally or practically individuals 
from discriminating against children.59 
57 See in this Commentary, Chapter 1. 58 Muscroft (n 6) 35. 
59 See CRC Committee, 'General Comment No 16: State obligations regarding the impact of the business 
sector on children's rights' (2013) CRC/C/GC/16 ('CRC GC 16') para 14: 'States are required to prevent dis-
crimination in the private sphere in general and provide remedy if it occurs'. 
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The second question to arise is whether non-discrimination clauses may also have hori-
zontal effect and generate non-discrimination duties for individuals themselves. One may 
distinguish between two types of potential horizontal effect of article 2 of the CRC: direct 
horizontal effect and indirect horizontal effect. 
Granting article 2 direct horizontal effect would mean that the non-discrimination 
principle binds individuals directly in their relations to children. This is controversial do-
mestically. It is even more so in international law. States are by and large still the only par-
ties to international treaties and hence the only direct bearers of the duties they give rise 
to. They are also the only ones responsible before international monitoring bodies. As a 
result, direct horizontal effect has never been granted to the non-discrimination principle 
in international law. It could be recognized, however, through domestic law provided do-
mestic law grants the prohibition of non-discrimination direct horizontal effect in some 
or all circumstances, on the one hand, and the latter extends to international law within 
the domestic legal order, on the other. 
In the absence of direct horizontal effect, international guarantees of the principle 
of non-discrimination are generally regarded as having indirect horizontal effect. What 
this means is that domestic judges and other institutions ought to refer to the principle 
of non-discrimination to interpret domestic private law and the law regulating inter-
individual relationships in a way that prohibits discrimination among private parties. 
Article 2 of the CRC clearly is meant to have such an indirect horizontal effect and binds 
domestic authorities in the interpretation of the Convention's rights.60 
3. Territorial Scope 
Article 2(1) applies to all children under the State's jurisdiction. This is a broad clause 
that was thoroughly debated in the travaux preparatoires.61 Such jurisdiction clauses have 
now become common practice in international and regional human rights law and their 
interpretation by courts or quasi-judicial bodies62 has generated substantial debates.63 
Curiously, article 2 of the CRC's jurisdiction clause replaces a general jurisdiction clause 
6° CRC Committee, CO Cambodia, CRC/C/15/Add.128 para 26 ('The Committee recommends that the 
general principles of the Convention (arr. 2, 3, 6, and 12) be included in all relevant legislation affecting chil-
dren and taken into account in all administrative and judicial decisiom, as well as in all policies and programmes 
related to children' (emphasis added)); CO Niger, CRC/C/15/Add.179 para 26. 
61 The revised draft (UN Doc E/CN.4/1349), which was the basic working document for the working 
group, mentioned that the rights extended ro all children 'in the territories' of the States Parries. The formula-
tion remained the same after the first reading (UN Doc E/CN.4/1988/WG.l/WP.l/Rev.l) . UNICEF made 
the suggestion to complete the formulation by adding 'in their territories or subject to their jurisdiction'. 
During the second reading, some states proposed amending the 'or' with 'and' but it was finally agreed that 
reference to territories would be deleted and only the reference to jurisdiction would be kept (see UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1989/48 paras 146- 69). All extracts are reproduced in OHCHR, Legislative History (n 47) 74-75, 83, 
331- 33. See ICCPR art 2: 'to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction'. 
62 See eg: ICJ, Legal Comequences of the Construction of the Wall (Advisory Opinion) [2004] IC] Rep. 136 
para 107 ff; HR Committee, Lopez Burgos v Uruguay Communication no 52/1979 (final views adopted on 
29 July 1981); in the regional context: ECtHR, Al-Skeini v United Kingdom App no 55721107 Qudgment of 
7 July 2011). 
63 See Samantha Besson, 'The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why Human 
Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts to' (2012) 25 Leiden Journal oflnternational 
Law 857; Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles and Policy 
(Oxford 2011); Malcolm Langford, Wourer Vandenhole, Marrin Scheinin, and Willem Van Genugten (eds), 
Global justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International 
Law (Cambridge University Press 2012); Olivier De Schutter, 'Globalization and Jurisdiction: Lessons from 
the European Convention on Human Rights' (2006) 6 Baltic Yearbook ofinternational Law 183. 
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in the Convention. This combination of a general and non-discrimination jurisdiction 
clause may actually also be found in other international human rights instruments (eg 
art 2, ICCPR). 
As is clear from the travaux preparatoires, the notion of 'jurisdiction' is not equivalent 
to those of 'territory' or 'nationality'. In a nutshell, the Convention's non-discrimination 
principle's jurisdiction clause excludes limiting the prohibition of discrimination only to 
those children situated on the territory of the State party or .only to children who hold 
the nationality of the State party as opposed to foreign children.64 The jurisdiction of a 
State party extends to national and foreign children inside and outside its territory when 
that territory is occupied or protected by the State or when the State exercises a form of 
effective control over those children ourside its territory.65 
This applies whether the discriminated child is under the state's jurisdiction regularly 
or not.66 During the drafting process, the United States tried to limit the scope of the 
protection to those children who were 'lawfully' in a territory. This proposal was harshly 
criticized and finally abandoned.67 As such, the Convention specifically addresses the 
rights of certain groups of vulnerable children, such as refugee children, children in 
trouble with the law, children in situations of armed conflict, and children from mi-
nority groups. 
Finally, article 2 of the CRC applies to children under a State party's jurisdiction 
whether or not the state from which this child is a national has ratified the Convention. 
The only exceptions to this general rule are those foreseen in article 22 of the CRC which 
deals with refugee children.68 
D. Content: 'Without Discrimination of Any Kind' 
States shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the CRC 'without discrimination of 
any kind' . To capture the exact content of the prohibition of discrimination, it is important 
to start by presenting some distinctions pertaining to the concept of non-discrimination, 
before looking more closely at the relevant conception of discrimination and at its consti-
tutive elements. Finally, special measures, that is, measures aiming at achieving material 
equality and that amount to a special kind of positive non-discrimination duties, are also 
considered. . 
I. Concept of Non-Discrimination 
There are different distinctions necessary to the identification of the concept of non-
discrimination in practice. The following distinctions are of particular relevance: the 
64 HRC GC 31 (n 39) para 10. 
65 ibid para 10; IC], Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall (Advisory Opinion) [2004] IC] Rep 
136, para 107 ff See for an interesting application of territorial jurisdiction to the father of a child to benefit the 
child: Appellant's Submissions in DWN021 v The Republic of Nauru in the High Court of Australia on Appeal 
from the Supreme Court of Nauru No Ml45 of2017 paras 55-64 available on line: http://www.hcourr.gov. 
au/cases/case_ml45-2017 (accessed 20 April 2018) (discussing and using this notion of jurisdiction to argue 
that when considering an application by a father located within the territory of a state for refugee status, rhe 
state must take into account the best interests of a child of that father (consistent with art 3 of the Convention) 
even though the child is in another state and not under the power or control of the state). 
66 LeBlanc (n 7) 95- 96. 
67 UN Doc E/CN.4/L.1575 paras 39-56 reproduced in Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Legislative History (n 47) 321-23. 
68 Detrick (n 7) 69-70. 
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distinction between equality and non-discrimination, the distinction between formal and 
material equality, and the distinction between equality before and in the law. 
(a) Equality and Non-Discrimination 
Article 2 CRC does not guarantee 'equality'. All it does is prohibit 'discrimination'. In this 
respect, it is unlike other general or ground-specific non-discrimination clause one finds 
in internat'.on~ ~um.an rights instruments that usually associate the principles of equality 
and non-drscnmmanon.69 Equality and non-discrimination are indeed often understood 
a~ positiv~ and negative statements of the same principle.7° According to this common 
vrew, one rs treated equally when one is not discriminated against, and one is discrimin-
ated against when one is not treated equally. 71 
The lack of mention of the principle of equality in the Convention does not have 
significant consequences for the interpretation of article 2 CRC, however. The CRC 
Committee als.o refers to equality when interpreting the non-discrimination principle. It 
actually somenmes uses both principles interchangeably.72 
(b) Formal and Material Equality 
Article 2 CRC aims at realizing not only formal, bur also material equality. The CRC 
Committee has stressed many times that the non-discrimination principle does not mean 
identical treatment in every instance. 73 
Equality may be deemed formal when what matters is the different treatment of similar 
situations or the similar treatment of different situations seen in strict terms. By contrast, 
what matters for material equality is whether someone is treated differently in practice 
or de facto. 74 Someone may be treated equally from a f~rmal perspective, but be treated 
differently materially when her or his position is assessed from a practical standpoint. 
~wo further distinctions help clarifying the notion of material equality. 
First, one usually opposes equality of opportunities to equality of results. Whereas the 
former is an equality of starting gates, as when men and women are given equal education, 
the latter looks at results, as when men and women have not fared equally well overall in 
the labo~r market, although they have been given equal chances. Measures of protection 
of equality may focus on the former or the latter, depending on the overall policy one fol-
lows. _Promoting equality of opportunities is usually regarded as less damaging for formal 
equality than targeting inequalities of resulr.75 
Second, one may contrast symmetrical with asymmetrical equality. When equality calls 
for the equal treatment of similar situations and the differentiated treatment of different 
situati~ns, i: is referred to .as symmetrical equality. Equal treatment does not necessarily 
mean 1denn_cal treatment m every instance, however.76 Some persons or situations may 
call :or special.measures of protection and favourable treatment. When equality justifies 
special protection of people with special needs or favourable treatment to correct past or 
.
69 O~ ~e relationship between equality and non-discrimination, see Besson, 'The Egalitarian 
D1mens1on (n 8) . 
70 Bayefsky (n 11) 1. Contra: Elisa Holmes, 'Anti-discrimination Rights without Equality' (2005) 68 
Modern Law Review 175. 
71 McKean (n 11) 285. 72 eg CRC GC 14 (n 52) para 41. 
73 CRC GC 5 (n 37) para 12. See also HRC GC 18 (n 25) para 8. 
74 See PCIJ, Minority Schools in Albania [1935] PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 64, 19. See also HRC GC 18 
(n 25) para 8. 
75 See eg ECJ, Case C-450/93 Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] ECR I-3051. 
76 Bayefsky (n 11) 11; ECtHR, Belgian Linguistic Cases (1986) Series A no 6, para 10. 
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present discrimination, one speaks of asymmetrical equality. This opposition between 
symmetrical and asymmetrical equality actually corresponds to two successive trends 
in the history of the development of non-discrimination law: first of all, the idea that 
equality implies similarity and, second, the idea that equality protects, on the contrary, 
diversity. 
Whereas duties to protect formal equality are necessarily symmetrical, this is not the case 
in respect of duties to promote material equality. The latter may indeed be undifferenti-
ated and target all groups indifferently, as with general education programmes or other ac-
tive promotions of equality which benefit everybody. But they may also-and this is more 
controversial-favour groups over others, thus discriminating some of them formally in 
order to redress material discrimination. 
(c) Equality before and in the Law 
The major case of formal equality is legal equality or equality de Jure. This includes equality 
before the law, but also equality in the law. 
Equality before the law pertains to the status of a person when the law applies to her. For 
instance, equality before the law is in question when the legal subjecthood is unequally dis-
tributed. Equality in the law by contrast is the equality the law guarantees in effect. Equality 
in the law thus addresses the lawmaker. For instance, gender equality in the law can be exe~­
plified by the equal treatment of the duties of men and women in family law. 
Unlike article 26 of the ICCPR, article 2 of the CRC does not expressly guarantee the 
concept of equality before the law. Of course, such an express recognition of the child's legal 
personality may have been useful. It may be derived indirectly, however, from article 12(2) 
of the CRC's guarantee of the right of the child to participate in procedures and be heard.77 
By contrast, article 2 of the CRC protects equality in the law. This has been confirmed 
by the Committee in its guidelines and its monitoring of States Parties' legislation for 
violations of equality.78 One finds another confirmation in article 4 of the CRC's duties 
of implementation of equality that mention legislative duties of implementation. 
2. Conception of Discrimination 
Article 2 of the CRC does not define the concept of 'discrimination' and the CRC 
Committee has never defined it clearly. All it said on the subject in its first general com-
ment issued in 2001 was that: 
discrimination on the basis of any of the grounds listed in article 2 of the Convention, whether it 
is overt or hidden, offends the human dignity of the child and is capable of undermining or even 
destroying the capacity of the child to benefit from educational opportunities.79 
The absence of a clear definition is not surprising. Although non-discrimination is a 
dominant and recurring principle of international human rights law, its content has not 
been specified in a detailed fashion in the different sources of international law. 80 As Judge 
Tanaka noted in the South West Africa Case, 'although the existence of this principle [of 
non-discrimination] is universally recognised ... its precise content is not very clear' .81 
77 Van Bueren (n 7) 45. 78 Hodgkin and Newell (n 6) 22. 
79 CRC Committee, 'General Comment No 1: Article 29 (1): The Aims of Education' (2001) ('CRC GC 
l ') reproduced in 'Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies' (2008) HRI/GEN/ l/Rev.9 (Vol II) 384. 
80 Bayefsky (n 11) 34. 
8 1 ICJ, South WestAftica (Second Phase, Judgment) [1966] ICJ Rep 3, 6. 
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A widely used definition of discrimination is the one given by the UN Human Rights 
Committee ('HR Committee') in its general comment on non-discrimination. According 
to this definition, discrimination should be understood as: 
any distinction, exclusion, restriction _or preference which is based on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, en-
joyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. 82 
This understanding combines the key elements of the various definitions of discrimin-
ation one finds in international human rights law. On the one hand, it corresponds to 
those one finds in the.110 Convention no 111 and the UNESCO Convention about 
education. 83 It also corresponds to the definition of discrimination against women (art l, 
CEDAW) and the definition of racial discrimination (art l, ICERD), both of them being 
expressly cited by the HR Committee as a source of inspiration. On the other hand, 
later definitions of discrimination adopted by other UN human rights treaty bodies after 
the HR Committee's general comment on non-discri!11ination and in international and 
regional Conventions84 were actually modelled on it. For example, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ('ESCR Committee') has chosen a similar, albeit 
not identical, definition in its 2009 general comment on the notion of discrimination.85 
This common understanding of discrimination in the international human rights con-
text applies to article 2 of the CRC. Indeed, the fact that article 2 features a similar struc-
ture and wording as other existing non-discrimination clauses in international law shows 
a clear intention to keep in line with what applies more generally in international non-
discrimination law. Moreover, the CRC Committee often refers to other international 
instruments in its interpretations, and usually follows the approach adopted by other UN 
human rights treaty bodies.86 
3. Constitutive Elements of Discrimination 
The general definition of discrimination entails various constitutive elements. Those elem-
ents have been specified over time by the UN human rights treaty bodies87 and regional 
human rights courrs.88 In a nutshell, the principle of non-discrimination is understood as 
82 HRC GC 18 (n 25) para 7. 
83 See: art 1 ILO Convention No 111 (n 30); art 1 UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in 
Education (n 30) . 
84 See CRPD art 2: 'Discrimination on the basis of disability means any distinction, exclusion or restriction 
on the basis of disability which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment 
or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural, civil or any other field'. See also the definition of discrimination in the Inter-American 
Convention against all Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance (n 32). 
85 ESCR Committee, 'General Comment No 20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural 
rights (art 2, para 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)' (2009) E/C.12/ 
GC/20 ('ESCR GC 20') para 7. 
86 See eg: CRC GC 5 (n 37) para 12 (making special reference to the HRC's general comment 18 on non-
discrimination); CRC GC 11 (n 53) para 18. 
87 HR Committee, Canessa et al v Uruguay Communications nos 1637/2011, 1757/2008, and 1765/2008 
(final views adopted on 24 October 2011) paras 9- 1 O; HR Committee, Broeks v Netherlands Communication 
no 172/984 (final views adopted on 9 April 1987); HRC GC 18 (n 25), para 13; ESCR GC 20 (n 85) para 13. 
88 See: ECtHR, Belgian Linguistic Cases (1968) Series A no 6, para 10; ECtHR, Abdulaziz, Caba/es and 
Balkandali v United Kingdom (1985) Series A no 94, para 72; Inter-Am. CtHR, Proposed Amendments to the 
Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 (1984) Series A no 4, 
paras 56- 57 (making reference to the case law of the ECtHR). 
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the prohibition of treating similar situations differently without an objective justification. 
Although the CRC Committee does not usually specify the elements of discrimination, 
it has already invoked this definition in the past.89 
There are three elements in the definition:90 an unfavourable treatment based on a pro-
hibited ground that cannot be justified. Each of these elements has to be interpreted fur-
ther to adapt to the child-specific context. 
(a) An Unfavourable Treatment 
To start with, discrimination implies a difference of treatment of similar situations or a 
similar treatment of different situations.91 What makes situations different or alike is a 
matter of evaluation of which substantial factual differences should count and of how 
they should count. This is clearly a very controversial evaluation to perform, particularly 
in the context of child discrimination. It should not, however, be confused with the judg-
ment of discrimination itself which relies on the pre-existence of a similar situation being 
treated differently. 
When one assesses whether situations are alike and should therefore be treated alike, it 
is important to determine what should be the criterion of comparison. The general case 
is a comparison between children. For instance, girls should not be treated differently from 
boys at school. A special case one should mention, however, is that of a comparison be-
tween children and adults. This is probably the most difficult assessment to perform. On 
the one hand, the Convention itself recognizes the specificity of the child's situation and 
thus points out the difference between children and adults. Consequently, children must 
be treated differently. As the Inter-Am. CtHR noted in its advisory opinion on children 
rights, 'differentiated treatment granted to adults and to minors is not discriminatory 
per se'.92 On the other hand, a great achievement of the Convention is the recognition 
that children are right-holders. Thus the Convention itself does not endorse the view that 
children are always in a different position just because they are children and cannot be 
treated as adults. One may think of many differences of treatment between children.and 
adults that are not justified.93 
The difference of treatment or distinction at stake may cover any kind of treatment 
one may think of. Legislation, measures, and practices that have the purpose or the effect 
of nullifying or impairing the guaranteed rights are prohibited. It is thus not necessary to 
show intent to discriminate. This is also what follows from most international guarantees 
of the principle of non-discrimination.94 
89 CRC Committee, CO Belgium, CRC/C/15/Add.178 para 6: 'With respect to article 2, the Committee, 
noting that the general principle of non-discrimination in the Convention prohibits differences in treatment 
on grounds that are arbitrary and objectively unjustifiable, including nationality, is concerned that the declar-
ation on article 2 may restrict the enjoyment of non-Belgian children in Belgium of rights contained in the 
Convention'. See also eg CRC GC No 20 (n 54) para 2L 
90 Bayefsky (n 11) 11-24. 
91 Alston (n 7) 6. See ECtHR, Thlimmenos v Greece ECHR 2000-IV 263. 
92 Inter-Am. CtHR, juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion OC-17 /02 
(2002) Series A no 17, para 55. See also ECtHR, D G v Ireland ECHR 2002-Ill 361, para 115. 
93 See the examples in Child Rights Information Network, Guide to Non-discrimination and the CRC 
(CRIN 2009) 4; see also Claire Breen, Age Discrimination and Children's Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2006), 
20-33 (discussing in detail which criteria should be taken into account to assess differences of treatment be-
tween children and adults). 
94 McKean (n 11) 287; Bayefsky (n 11) 8-10. 
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This means that both direct and indirect discrimination are prohibited by article 2 of 
the CRC. In fact, the CRC Committee urges states to combat both forms of discrim-
ination, but does not define the terms explicitly.95 Direct discrimination occurs when 
a difference of treatment is based on a protected characteristic. Indirect discrimination 
takes place when a law or a measure is based on a seemingly innocuous ground, but 
disadvantages certain children in fact. For instance, a disabled child may be indirectly 
discriminated against by a rule which requires written work as an admission test to a 
school. True, formally speaking, this ground of discrimination is perfectly innocuous and 
admissible in an educational context. However, seen from the perspective of a disabled 
child, it might constitute an insurmountable obstacle in the access to further education 
and integration.96 
Article 2(2) of the CRC mentions a special form of discrimination: that is, any form 
of punishment related to the child's parents' or guardians' status. This is an additional 
child-specific dimension of the principle of non-discrimination in the CRC that focuses 
on the fact that children are ofren discriminated in ways that match their specific position 
in human society. And punishment constitutes one of those established social practises 
that apply to children specifically. Children have indeed become the victims of human 
rights violations, including imprisonment or torture because of actions that their parents 
or family members have engaged in.97 
(b) Based on a Prohibited Ground 
A differential treatment of comparable cases may only be deemed discriminatory if the 
ground on which the differential treatment is based constitutes a prohibited ground of 
discrimination or if the consequence of the differential treatment is the imposition of a 
particular disadvantage to persons belonging to a protected group. 
Article 2(1) of the CRC provides a long list of suspect classification and discriminatory 
grounds. This list is only exemplary and can be extended to other criteria. As we will see, 
the CRC Committee has made extensive use of the non-exhaustive character of this list. 
Interestingly, article 2(l)'s list of grounds indicates that the prohibition against dis-
crimination applies both to the 'child's and her or his parents' or legal guardian's' race, 
colour, gender, language, and the like. Article 2(1) is the only international guarantee of 
the principle of non-discrimination that expressly states that a person can be discrimin-
ated against not only because of her or his status, but also because of the status of a person 
close to her or him. Article 2(2) only applies, by contrast, to the discrimination of chil-
dren that is based on the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of their parents, 
legal guardians, or family members. 
Article 2(1) lists the suspect classifications foreseen in most international and re-
gional human rights instruments, such as the UDHR, the ICCPR, the ICSCR, and 
the UNESCO Convention against D iscrimination in Education, bur adds an important 
one: disability. Discrimination against persons with disabilities was largely ignored at the 
time of the adoption of the UNDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, and ICERD. It was still the case 
in 1979 when the CEDAW was adopted, although the first steps towards the recognition 
of the rights of persons with disabilities date back to the 1970s. The CRC is more recent, 
95 See: CRC Committee, CO Austria, CRC/C/AUT/C0/3-4 para 25; CO Viet Nam, CRC/C/VNM/CO/ 
3-4 para 29; CO Thailand, CRC/C/THA/C0/3-4 para 33. See, however, CRC GC 1 (n 79), for the oppos-
ition between 'overt' and 'hidden' discrimination. 
96 Lansdown, 'It is our World Too!' (n 4) 24. 97 LeBlanc (n 7) 97. 
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however, and this explains why it was the first international convention to contain a spe-
cific reference to this ground of discrimination. As a matter of fact, discrimination against 
children with disabilities was (and still is) one of the most common case of discrimination 
against children (see also article 7, CRPD). 
Article 2 does not mention birth out of wedlock as a ground of discrimination even if this 
ground is often used in practice to differentiate between children.98 It was a sensitive topic 
at the time of the drafting of the Convention and although there was mention at some stage 
in the travaux preparatoires of the need to protect non-marital children expressly against 
discrimination when compared to marital children, this was not done in the end for lack 
of consensus.99 It was also argued that the term 'birth' already covered children born out of 
wedlock.100 Furthermore, it became clear that this ground of discrimination could not only 
be derived from others in article 2 CRC, but also from other international and regional guar-
antees against discrimination.101 In fact, article 41 of the CRC encourages the most liberal 
interpretation of the Convention's provisions by giving priority to more favourable inter-
national clauses over less protective norms in the CRC. 
The debate on the inclusion of this or that ground of discrimination loses its signifi-
cance as soon as one looks at how the CRC Committee has made extensive use of the non-
exhaustive character of article 2 of the CRC. The Committee has interpreted the notion of 
'other status' to extend the protection against discrimination to grounds not even discussed 
during the drafting process. So far, the Committee has identified no less than fifty-three 
grounds of discrimination based on the child's status or her or his parents' status, 102 including 
sexual orientation and HN/Aids.103 The Committee has furthermore condemned discrimin-
ation based on sexual orientation in various concluding observations.104 
There are no differences between the grounds explicitly covered by article 2 and 
grounds recognized later on by the Committee. The only difference one may think of is 
related to implementation. According to the Committee, all grounds for discrimination 
expressly spelled out in article 2 CRC should be reflected in States Parties' domestic con-
stitution or legislation, and this is arguably not the case for other grounds.105 This is only a 
98 CRC Committee, CO Japan, CRC/C/JPN/C0/3 para 33; CO Mozambique, CRC/C/MOZ/C0/2 
para 30; CO Philippines, CRC/C/PHL/C0/3-4 paras 10, 29-30; CO Maldives, CRC/C/MDV/C0/3 para 33. 
99 See: E/CN .4/ 1324 (suggestion to include 'born out of wedlock' among the grounds of discrimination}; 
E/CN .4/1986/39 paras 13-21 (discussion in the working group 1986 of the proposal submitted by China and 
the proposal submitted by Austria ro include a specific provision regarding children born out of wedlock-no 
consensus reached}; E/CN.4/1988/28 paras 226-30 (discussion in the working group 1988 of the proposal 
submitted by Germany ro include a specific provision regarding children born out of wedlock-withdrawal of 
the proposal}. All extracts are reproduced in Legislative History (n 47) 315-28, 887-90. 
100 E/CN .411988/28 para 228; Legislative History (n 47) 889- 90. 
101 LeBlanc (n 7) 100- 01; Van Bueren (n 7) 41-45; Detrick (n 7) 75- 77. The ECtHR dealt with nu-
merous cases of discrimination between marital and non-marital children during the 1980s. According to 
the ECtHR, 'only very weighty reasons' can justify a difference of treatment between children born in or out 
wedlock: ECtHR, Marckx v Belgium (1979) Series A No 31; lnze vAustria (1988} Series A No 126, para 41. 
102 See: the list provided by Hodgkin and Newell (n 6) 24-25; Child Rights Information Network (n 93). 
103 CRC Committee, 'General Comment No 3: HIV/AIDS and the Rights of the Child' (2003) reproduced 
in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
(2008) HRI/GEN/l/Rev.9 (Vol II) 398 para 9. 
104 See eg: CO Romania, CRC/C/ROU/C05 paras 16 and 17; CO Mongolia, CRC/C/MNG/C0/5 paras 
15- 16; CO United Kingdom and Great Britain, CRC/C/GBR/C0/5 paras 21- 22 (all expressmgconcern with 
respect ro discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex children}. 
105 CRC Committee, 'General guidelines regarding the form and content of periodic reports to be sub-
mitted by States Parties under article 44, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention on the Rights of the Child' (1996) 
CRC/C/58 para 25. Note, however, that the actual guidelines are less clear in this regard. See 'Harmonized 
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slight difference, however. Moreover, the Committee has already requested States Parties 
to adopt legislation against discrimination based on sexual orientation, for example. 106 
Not only has the CRC Committee expanded the list of the protected grounds. It has 
also emphasized that discrimination is often based on more than one ground and that 
specific attention should be paid to these forms of multiple discrimination.107 
In a nutshell, one may distinguish three types of multiple discrimination of the child. 
First, many differences of treatment target specific groups of children, such as girls, for 
instance. Adults of the same group, women in this example, are not subject to the same 
detrimental treatment. In this case, age discrimination is combined with sex discrimin-
ation. One may think of female genital mutilation in girls as a case in point.108 Second, 
many children are discriminated against on multiple grounds, but age is not necessarily 
a factor in that discrimination. One may think of girls from rural areas who are deprived 
of their right to education. Third, a child may be discriminated against because of her or 
his status and the status of her or his parents. One may think of discrimination against 
coloured children whose parents have a same-sex relationship. 
These distinctions between multiple discrimination based on age and one or more 
grounds, on the one hand, and multiple discrimination based on other grounds than age, 
on the other, may seem artificial. It is difficult indeed to neatly separate the grounds that 
lead to discrimination in practice. However, these distinctions are useful to highlight the 
especially vulnerable position of children in society, and the Convention's lack of explicit 
protection against discrimination based on age together with other grounds. 
(c) In the Absence of Justification 
As the CRC Committee has explained, 'not every differentiation in treatment will con-
stitute discrimination' .109 It is only when these differences of treatment are unreasonable 
and lack an objective justification that they may be deemed discriminatory. 110 
The notion of a reasonable and objective justification entails two elements. First, 
the difference of treatment must pursue a legitimate aim (or pressing social need). 
Second, the measures to achieve the aim must be proportionate.111 Within the context 
guidelines on reporting under the international human rights treaties, including guidelines on a core document 
and treaty-specific documents' (2006} HRI/MC/2006/3 in 'Compilation of guidelines on the form and con-
tent of reports to be submitted by States Parties to the International human rights treaties' (2009} HRI/GEN/ 
2/Rev.6 and CRC Committee, 'Treaty-specific guidelines regarding the form and content of periodic reports to 
be submitted by States parties under article 44, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention on the Rights of the Child' 
(2015) CRC/C/58/Rev.3. 
106 CO Australia, CRC/C/AUS/C0/4 para 30; CO Korea, CRC/C/KOR/C0/3-4 para 28. 
107 CRC GC 9 (n 54) para 5; 'General Comment No 7: Implementing child rights in early childhood' 
(2006) reproduced in 'Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2008) HRI/GEN/ l/Rev.9 (Vol II) 466, para 11; CO Seychelles, CRC/C/SYC/ 
C0/2-4 para 35; CO Philippines, CRC/C/PHL/C0/3-4 para 30; CO Poland, CRC/C/POL/C0/3-4 paras 
16--17. See, on multiple discrimination against children, Camilla Ida Ravnbol, lntersectional Discrimination 
against Children: Discrimination against Romani Children and AnticDiscrimination Measures to Address Child 
Trafficking, Innocenti working paper (UNICEF 2009). 
108 See CO Guinea-Bissau, CRC/C/GNB/C0/2-4 para 24. 
109 CRC GC 20 (n 54) para 21. Discrimination is used here to refer to unjustified, unlawful and particu-
larly damaging differences of treatment. As a result, 'discrimination' itself cannot be justified stricto sensu. This 
reading is compatible with the text of art 2 CRC. Contra: Abramson (n 7) 22. ' 
11 0 See: CRC GC 20 (n 54); ECtHR, Belgian Linguistic Cases (1986) Series A no 6, para 10; HRC GC 18 
(n 25) para 13; Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant 
on Civil and. Political Rights E/CN.4/1985/4 (28 September 1984} Annex paras 10-11. 
11 1 This is what follows from the practice of various UN human rights treaty bodies and from the practice of 
regional courts, prominently the ECtHR (see eg ECtHR, Glor v Switzerland (App no 13444/04) Qudgement 
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of discrimination law, there are some general conditions for this proportionality test, 
although they are not always clearly articulated or strictly applied by courts or in prac-
tice:112 the means must be apt to attain the end, be necessary means to do so, and amount 
to the least restrictive means to reach that end.113 This approach may be regarded as 
consistent with the broader commentary in international law as to when an interference 
with an human right will be justified.114 Importantly, it is the state which carries the 
burden of providing evidence which establishes a nexus between the differential treat-
ment and the legitimate aim being pursued115-what is sometimes referred to as the 
rational connection test. 
One may distinguish two hypotheses of differential treatment justifiable in the context 
of article 2 of the CRC. First, differences of treatment may be required when the situ-
ations are different. This may be the case for certain distinctions made between children 
and adults, albeit not all of them. Second, even when situations are similar, a difference 
of treatment may be justified in order to achieve material equality. This would be the case 
for certain positive measures drawing formal distinctions between equally situated chil-
dren, albeit to enhance their material equality. Those 'special measures' are discussed in 
the next section. 
Importantly, in the context of child protection, article 3 of the CRC and its principle 
of the best interest of the child constitute an additional test in the justification of differ-
ential treatments between children and adults or between children only. 116 
4. Special Measures 
To achieve material equality, it is sometimes necessary to adopt special measures, 117 
that is, measures aimed at redressing material inequalities or improving de facto equality. 
of 30 April 2009) paras 72, 81 ff). See: ESCR GC 20 (n 85) para 13; UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination, 'General recommendation no 32: The meaning and scope of special measures in the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Racial Discrimination' (2009) CERD/C/GC/32 
para 8. The practice of the HR Committee is less dear, but the HR Committee sometimes refers explicitly to a 
proportionality test: HR Committee, Jacobs v Belgium Comm no 94312000 (final views adopted on 17 August 
2004) para 9 .5; Gillot v France Comm no 932/2000 (final views adopted 27 July 2002) paras 13.2, 13.17. See 
also: HRC GC 18 (n 25) para 13; CRC GC No 20 (n 54) para 21. 
112 See Samantha Besson, 'Evolutions in Ami-Discrimination Law within the ECHR and the ESC Systems' 
(2012) 60 American Journal of Comparative Law 147. 
l 13 Although the CRC Committee does not generally make reference to proportionality, it has already em-
phasized that special measures should be taken when they appear to be necessary: CO Australia, CRC/C/AUS/ 
C0/4 para 30; CO United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, (2008) CRC/C/GBR/C0/4 para 25. 
114 Siracusa Principles (n 110) paras 10- 11; John Tobin, The Right to Health in International Law (OUP 
2012) 180-84. 
115 Siracusa Principles (n 110) paras 10 and 12. 116 Muscroft (n 6) 30. 
117 Note on the terminology: special measures are often equated with 'affirmative action', 'positive measures' 
and 'positive action'. However, the term 'special measures' is the most adequate term in the international con-
texr because it is compatible with various international human rights instruments (see art 4(1) CEDAW; art 
1 (4) ICERD). Affirmative action is most commonly used in the USA while the term 'positive action' or 'posi-
tive measures' is the term most often adopted in Europe. One should note, however, that the terms 'positive 
action' and 'positive measures' can add to the confusion because positive action may be conflated with positive 
duties, whereas positive duties do not necessarily amount to duties to adopt special measures. Finally, the term 
'positive discrimination' should be avoided as it emails a contradiction in terms. See on these questions: UN 
Commission on Human Rights, 'The concept and practice of affirmative action. Preliminary report submitted 
by Mr Marc Bossuyr, Special rapporteur, in accordance with Sub-Commission resolution 1998/5' (2000) UN 
DocE/CN.4/Sub.2/2000111; UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 'General 
Recommendation No 25: Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention (temporary special measures) (2004)' re-
produced in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies (2008) HRI/GEN/l/Rev.9 (Vol II) 365. 
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These measures should not be confused with positive (action) measures in general.118 
Positive action involves a wide range of measures and special measures only constitute a 
subset of those. 
Article 2 of the CRC does not expressly foresee the duty to adopt special measures or, 
at least, the justification for doing so, by contrast to what non-discrimination clauses 
in other international human rights instruments do. 119 All the same, article 2 protects 
equality among children in a more Hexible and open way than previous general non-
discrimination clauses. 120 It generally prohibits measures which treat differently similar 
situations and equally different situations. As such, it clearly protects formal equality and 
requests negative measures of non-discrimination. However, article 2 has also been inter-
preted as protecting material equality and as imposing positive duties, and these in turn 
may include special measures. 
More particularly, article 2 could be interpreted as giving rise to two kinds of special 
measures to promote material equality. 
First of all, special protection measures which are selective and address special needs. 
Those measures are even more important in the case of children, as children may be par-
ticularly vulnerable by way of past discriminations and those discriminations impact how 
one may redress their material inequality. The Preamble to the CRC actually recognizes 
that ' in all countries of the world, there are children living in exceptionally difficult con-
ditions, and that such children need special consideration'. Hence, for instance, the spe-
cial measures mentioned in articles 22 and 23 of the CRC for the special protection of 
disabled and refugee children. 
These special measures of protection are, however, very controversial. Although one 
may understand the need for measures of special care, there is a sense in which claiming 
that some children have special needs and that they are somehow different as a result 
is in itself discriminatory both against them and other children. Special measures may 
also be deemed discriminatory because different treatment to answer special needs often 
amounts to less favourable treatment. Recent European cases of Roma children sent to 
special schools for 'children with special needs' have highlighted the poor quality of edu-
cation provided by these schools. The children followed simpler curricula and had fewer 
opportunities than in mainstream schools.121 
Criticism of special protection measures on grounds of indirect discrimination has led 
to the development of a new trend in non-discrimination law and the emergence of more 
inclusive rights and mainstreaming.122 Those new approaches reject the differentiating 
effect of special measures and recommend adopting more inclusive measures which pro-
tect neutral activities such as parenthood instead of motherhood or an inclusive right to 
education instead of a right to special education. One may identify the same trend with 
respect to the education of children with disabilities. In that context, it is now generally 
accepted that integration should be the standard and separate schooling the exception.123 
118 Bayefsky (n 11) 24-33. 119 See CEDAW art 4(1) and (2); ICERD art 1(4). 
120 Alston (n 7) 1. 
121 See ECtHR, D.H and others v Czech Republic [GC] ECHR 2007-IV 241. See also regarding the 
schooling of children with disabilities: ECtHR, Horvdth and Kiss v Hungary App no 11146/1 1 Oudgmem of 
29 January 201 3). 
122 Lansdown, 'It is our World Too!' (n 4) 18-20. 
123 See European Committee on Social Rights, Autism-Europe v France Complaint no 13/2000 (decision on 
the merits of 4 November 2003). 
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The CRC Committee highlighted that point in its general comment on the rights of chil-
dren with disabilities.124 The CRPD has also confirmed this shift in the understanding 
of the needs of children with disabilities and insists on inclusive education at all levels 
(CRPD art 24).125 
Second, one should also mention temporary special measures which aim at remedying 
the situation of material inequality of a certain group. They go further than special pro-
tection measures. Temporary special measures openly favour certain people identified by 
their status in order to eliminate conditions which have caused or perpetuated discrim-
ination in practice. As they openly use suspect discrimination grounds to differentiate 
people and formally discriminate, special temporary measures are subject to strict condi-
tions in international human rights law126 and in the practice of the Committee.127 First 
of all, they are only justified for a limited period of time. They should be discontinued 
when their targeted results have been achieved. Special measures should, moreover, be 
accompanied by other measures which focus on other dimensions of the discrimination 
process than its results. Finally, they should be aimed at a special group and never be 
absolute. 128 
The CRC Committee imposes on States Parties a duty to 'identify individual children 
and groups of children the recognition and realization of whose rights may demand spe-
cial measures'. 129 To identify these children, states are in particular requested to provide 
statistical data, as explained below. 
E. Monitoring 
The implementation of States Parties' duties is controlled primarily domestically through 
the monitoring of national courts and then internationally through that of the CRC 
Committee. Given its prevalence in practice, the admissibility of the budgetary exception 
in discrimination cases also needs to be discussed. 
1. Domestic Monitoring 
Article 2 is directly applicable by domestic authorities, on the model of article 2(1) of the 
ICCPR.130 
The implementation of article 2 can and should be monitored by domestic courts, 
as a result. The latter should apply the Convention's non-discrimination principle like 
any other domestic non-discrimination principle. To mention one example: a potential 
domestic piece of legislation that differentiates between adopted children and children 
conceived artificially could be sanctioned judicially on the basis of article 2, and lead to 
124 CRC GC 9 (n 54) para 66. 125 See chapter 23 of this Commentary. 
126 HRC GC 18 (n 25) para 10: 'as long as these special measures are needed to correct discrimination in 
fact, it is a case of legitimate differentiation'. 
127 CO India, CRC/C/15/Add.228 paras 31-32: ('While welcoming the special temporary programmes 
and other activities to improve the enjoyment of rights by girls and vulnerable groups such as children be-
longing to Scheduled Castes and Tribes, the Committee expresses its concern at the possibility that other 
children in situations similar to that of those groups are not receiving the same benefits. 32. The Committee 
recommends that all existing and future special temporary programmes be provided with specified goals and 
timetables, in order to evaluate their success and justify their continuation, expansion and dissemination. The 
Committee further recommends that the State party start to develop special programmes for the allocation of 
educational and other benefits that are based on the child's needs and rights rather than on the basis of sex, caste 
or tribe, or any other characteristic that may result in unjustifiable discrimination'). 
128 HRC GC 18 (n 25) para 10. 129 CRC GC 5 (n 37) para 12. 130 Derrick (n 7) 69. 
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the recognition of the absolute right to know one's origins independently of one's mode 
of conception.131 
Importantly, therefore, the prohibition of discrimination is recognized as a directly 
justiciable right whether the discrimination occurs in the ambit of a civil right or an 
economic, social; and cultural right. It is not subject to the progressive realization prin-
ciple132 and the distinction between the two categories of rights under article 4 of the 
CRC cannot be invoked to mitigate the effects of article 2. On the contrary, the non-
discrimination principle can be used to trigger judicial control of economic and social 
issues, as exemplified in the practice of the HR Committee on article 26 of the ICCPR.133 
2. International Monitoring 
The international monitoring of states takes place primarily134 through the examination 
of periodic reports submitted to the CRC Committee (CRC art 44). The Committee has 
issued general guidelines regarding the form and content of initial (CRC art 44(l)a) and 
periodic (CRC art 44(l)b) reports. Each of them contains specific sections relative to the 
non-discrimination principle. 135 
These guidelines are complemented by the harmonized guidelines on reporting under 
the international human rights treaties which contain all relevant indications regarding 
the constitution of the 'common core document', that is, the first part of the report to be 
submitted to the UN human rights treaty bodies.136 As the non-discrimination principle 
is a central provision in all international human rights treaties, it is no surprise that States 
Parties are requested to provide relevant information concerning the application of the 
principle of non-discrimination in this common core document. 
Under those harmonized guidelines, States Parties have the following obligations. First 
of all, they are requested to provide information on the implementation of their inter-
national obligations to guarantee equality before the law and equal protection of the law 
for everyone under their jurisdiction and factual information on measures taken to elim-
inate discrimination in all its forms and on all grounds, including multiple discrimination. 
rn It has been the case in Switzerland, in particular. See ATF 128 I 63; Samantha Besson, 'Das Recht auf 
Kenn mis der eigenen Abstammung- Wege undAuswirkungen der Konkretisierung eines Grundrechts' (2005) 
Revue de droit suisse 39; Samantha Besson, 'Enforcing the Child's Right to Know Her Origins: Contrasting 
Approaches under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention on Human 
Rights' (2007) 21 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 137. · 
132 See ESCR Committee, 'General Comment No 3: The Nature of Scates Parties Obligations (art. 2, para 
1, of the Covenant)' (1990) reproduced in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendatiom 
adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies (2008) HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol I) 7, para 5; Economic and Social 
Council, 'Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: the concept of progressive 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights in international human rights law' (2007) UN Doc E/2007 I 
82, para 15: 'First of all, it is important to note that not all obligations relating to economic, social and cul-
tural rights are subject to progressive realization and the "maximum of available resources" clause. Notably, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities all impose an immediate obligation ro guarantee 
that economic, social and cultural rights are enjoyed without discrimination' . 
133 See HR Committee, F.H. Zwaan-de Vries v the Netherlands Comm no 182/ 1984 (final views adopted 
9 April 1987) paras 12.4-12.5. 
134 The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure 
(adopted 19 December 2011, entered into force 14 April 2014) UN Doc N RES/661138 provides an alterna-
tive method of international control over the implementation of the Convention by States Parties. 
135 CRC Committee, 'General guidelines' (n 37) paras 13-14; CRC Committee, 'Treaty-specific guidelines' 
(n 105) paras 23-27. 
136 'Harmonized guidelines' (n 105). 
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Second, States Parties should indicate whether the principle of non-discrimination is 
included as a general binding principle in a basic law, the constitution, a bill of rights, 
or in any other form of domestic legislation, and the definition of and legal ground~ for 
prohibiting discrimination. Interestingly, it is on that basis that the ~RC Comm1~tee 
has regularly requested states to revise their domestic law to adapt It to the require-
ments of article 2.137 Third, information should be provided on the steps taken to 
ensure that discrimination in all its forms and on all grounds is prevented and com-
bated. As already mentioned, the Committee emphasizes, in particular, the need for 
the collection of data to be disaggregated to enable potential discriminations to be 
identified. Finally, States Parties are asked to indicate the specific measures adopted 
to reduce economic, social, and geographical disparities, including between rural and 
urban areas; the specific measures to prevent discrimination, including situations of 
multiple discrimination; the specific measures against the persons belonging to t~e 
most disadvantaged groups; and in specific circumstances, whether temporary speoal 
measures have been taken.138 
Further, there is an entire section in the treaty-specific guidelines of the CRC 
Committee on the implementation of the principle of non-discrimination. It provides 
insights into the Committee's view of the States Parties' duties with regard t~ the proh.ib-
ition of discrimination. 139 For instance, the Committee requests States Pames to provide 
information on special measures taken in order to prevent discrimination and calls on the 
States Parties to mention measures taken to combat gender-based discrimination and to 
ensure the full enjoyment of their rights by children with disabilities, children belonging 
to minorities, and indigenous children. 
3. Budgetary Exception 
Limited budgetary resources are a common way of attempting to justify differential or 
unfavourable treatment of children. As a matter of fact, poverty constitutes one of the 
main causes of discrimination against children. The invocation of budgetary constraints 
raises very difficult issues in the context of positive action and special protection measures 
according to article 2(1) and (2) of the CRC. 
The issue of resources and budgetary allocations is treated in further detail elsewhere 
in this commentary.140 However, it is worth noting at this stage that, according to the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, the application of article 2 'cannot be made de-
pendent upon budgetary resources'. 141 Quite the reverse: the Committee re~uires that 
the implementation of the principle of non-discrimination of children be an 1mport~nt 
element of budget-making at national level. 142 Here again, the distinction regarding 
states' obligations according to whether the right at stake is economic, social, and cultural 
cannot be invoked to mitigate the effects of article 2. 
m CRC Committee, CO Israel, CRC/C/ISR/C0/2-4 para 22; CO Liberia, CRC/C/LBR/C0/2-4 para 
412; CO Viet Nam, CRC/C/VNM/C0/3-4 para 30; CO Ukraine, CRC/C/UKR/C0/3-4 para 28; CO The 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, CRC/C/MKD/C0/2 para 27. 
138 'Harmonized guidelines' (n 105) paras 50-58. 
139 CRC Committee, 'Treaty-specific guidelines' (n 105) paras 23- 27. . . 
140 See chapter 4 of this Commentary; see CRC Committee, 'General Comment No 19 on public budgenng 
for the realization of children's rights (art. 4)' (2016) CRC/C/GC/19. 
141 CRC Committee, CO Bolivia, CRC/C/15/Add.l para 14; CO France, CRC/C/15/Add.20, para 19. 
142 Hodgkin and Newell (n 6) 23. 
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F. Special Provisions Relating to Child Discrimination 
The CRC, like other international human rights instruments, guarantees the principle of 
non-discrimination in many places other than its non-discrimination clause. Those special 
provisions take priority over article 2 when applicable. 
Thus, the principle of non-discrimination may be found in article 22 of the CRC relating 
to the special protection of refugee children, in article 23 of the CRC relating to the special 
protection of disabled children, and in article 30 of the CRC relating to the special protec-
tion of indigenous children. One also finds echoes of the non-discrimination principle in 
different other provisions, like article 28 of the CRC in the context of the right to education. 
These leges speciales are addressed in detail elsewhere in this commentary.143 
Importantly for our purpose, one also finds child-specific non-discrimination clauses 
in other international human rights instruments and, in particular, in the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR144 and the CRPD. 
1. Leges Speciales in the ICCPR and the ICES CR 
The ICCPR and the ICESCR contain two leges speciales which extend the applicability of 
their respective general non-discrimination clause to children. According to article 24(1) of 
the ICCPR: 
Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or 
social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as 
a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State. 
This norm is restricted, however, to foreseeing the possibility of arranging special protection 
measures in favour of children and the need to ensure the absence of discrimination in these 
special measures. 
This specific approach to child discrimination in the context of special measures of protec-
tion is confirmed by article 10(3) of the ICESCR: 
Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all children and young per-
sons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions. Children and young per-
sons should be protected from economic and social exploitation. Their employment in work harmful 
to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal development should be 
punishable by law. States should also set age limits below which the paid employment of child labour 
should be prohibited and punishable by law. 
2. Lex Specialis in the CRPD 
The CRPD contains numerous provisions on the rights of children with disabilities. 145 
It has also become an important tool to enhance the protection of the rights of children 
with disabilities in practice. To be clear: all provisions in the CRPD apply to children. 
However, experiences with other international human rights instruments have revealed 
that the absence of explicit references to children's perspectives tend to make them 
143 See chapters 22, 23, 30, and 28 of this Commentary. 
144 There are other less general ones, of course, eg the ILO Conventions. See Marks and Clapham (n 31) 27. 
145 See Louis Alfonso de Alba, 'The Rights of the Child in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities' in Carol Bellamy and others (eds), Realizing the Rights of the Child, Swiss Human Rights Book 
(Ruffer & Rub 2007) Vol 2, 75- 77. 
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invisible in practice, even when situations of vulnerability are addressed.146 The inclusion 
of specific provisions regarding children with disabilities in the CRPD was thus necessary 
to avoid under-inclusive protection in practice, on the one hand, and restrictive interpret-
ation of the rights in respect of adults only, on the other. 
Regarding the principle of non-discrimination, article 7 of the CRPD is the central 
provision. According to its first paragraph: 
States Parties shall take all necessary measures to ensure the full enjoyment by children with disabil-
ities of all human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis with other children. 
It is interesting to note the difference in wording between article 2 of the CRC and art-
icle 7 of the CRPD. According to article 2(1) of the CRC, only the rights of the CRC 
are guaranteed without discrimination (derivative clause). Article 7 of the CRPD, by 
contrast, stipulates that 'all human rights and fundamental freedoms' of children with 
disabilities should be enjoyed on an equal basis with other children (autonomous clause). 
Various controversies have arisen with respect to article 7 of the CRPD. To start with, 
when special non-discrimination clauses in a ground-specific instrument are further spe-
cified in relation to a specific group (children in this case), there is a risk that other di-
mensions in the discriminatory treatment may become less visible. Moreover, during the 
drafting process of the CRPD, some government representatives actually argued that 
including specific provisions for children with disabilities might undermine the rights 
included in the CRC. In response to these arguments, it was made clear by the then chair 
of the Committee on the Rights of the Child that the CRPD had to be considered as 
reinforcing the existing rights under the CRC.147 The CRPD helps to 'elaborate the in-
terpretation of the CRC for children with disabilities' .148 The solution seems to be that 
whenever the provisions of the CRPD provide higher protection than the similar provi-
sions of the CRC, the former should apply (CRC art 41 (b)). 
III. Evaluation 
More than twenty-five years ago, the Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted 
and, within it, a guarantee of the non-discrimination principle entrenched prominently 
in article 2. This provision captures the child-specific dimensions of child discrimination 
and has been used most effectively against the latter. 
Retrospectively, this provision may be interpreted as a strong signal, for it marked the 
culmination of the progressive emergence of children's rights. The latter may indeed be 
conceived as the outcome of the gradual conquest of their equality, first of all, vis-a-vis 
adults, then in regard to young adults, and finally, with respect to other children. 
Regrettably, the prohibition of discrimination enshrined in article 2 CRC remains 
vague and may be still interpreted in various ways, including weaker ones. The notion of 
'special measures' is one of those current interpretive difficulties. That notion is in need of 
further clarification as special protection measures may have destructive discriminatory 
146 Gerison Lansdown, See Me, Hear Me: A Guide to using the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities to promote the Rights of Children (Save the Children 2009); ESCR Committee, 'General Comment 
No 5: Persons with Disabilities' (1994) reproduced in 'Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2008) HRI/GEN/l/Rev.9 (Vol I) 17. 
147 Lansdown, See Me, Hear Me (n 146), 23. 148 ibid. 
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consequences on particularly vulnerable children whose integration should be States 
Parties' foremost goal. Of course, assessing the objectives and proportionality of these 
special measures allows one to distinguish between non-discriminatory special measures 
and discriminatory ones. However, the proportionality test, as often, is open to varying 
interpretations. Given the centrality but also the complexity of the non-discrimination 
principle in the context of children's rights, the time has come therefore for a general 
comment of the CRC Committee on article 2 of the CRC. 
More generally, and thinking outside the children's rights realm, one may wonder about 
the justification of non-discrimination clauses in specific human rights instruments. There 
certainly are strong arguments in favour of specific instruments of protection against dis-
crimination.149 This is obvious when members of a specific group (eg children or persons 
with disabilities) have largely been ignored by the mainstream human rights movement 
and/or when general treaties are not adapted to the specific situation of a certain group. 
Specific treaties adopted to protect specific groups always carry with themselves a stigma-
tizing and essentializing risk, however. 150 Besides inequalities in human rights protection 
and hence ultimately in equaliry, 15 1 the fragmentation of international human rights in-
struments and non-discrimination clauses along group lines risks sidelining those groups' 
perspectives from general human rights and non-discrimination debates. In this respect, 
it suffices to observe how the issue of child discrimination has been neglected in recent 
general debates on the non-discrimination principle. 152 Non-discrimination is an element 
common to all human rights treaties and should thus be addressed more consistently in 
the future to avoid not only inequalities, but also gaps in the effective protection of all 
human beings' equal moral status. 
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Article 3. The Best Interests of the Child 
1. In all actions concerning children, 
whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, 
administrative authorities or legislative 
bodies, the best interests of the child shall 
be a primary consideration. 
or her, and, to this end, shall take all 
appropriate legislative and administrative 
measures. 
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the 
child such protection and care as is 
necessary for his or her well-being, taking 
into account the rights and duties of his 
or her parents, legal guardians, or other 
individuals legally responsible for him 
3. States Parties shall ensure that the institu-
tions, services and facilities responsible 
for the care or protection of children shall 
conform with the standards established 
by competent authorities, particularly in 
the areas of safety, health, in the number 
and suitability of their staff, as well as 
competent supervision. 
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